Ruminations on Rubber Hands
Lawrence Shapiro
University of Wisconsin – Madison
Department Colloquia
Department Colloquium: Lawrence Shaprio
Department Colloquium: Emily Kress
Abstract: Aristotle understands the generation of an animal as an actualization of two sorts of capacities: the active capacities provided by the father, functioning as the efficient cause and the source of the form, and the passive capacities provided by the mother, who supplies the matter on which the efficient cause acts. Eventually, an animal comes to be, equipped with features—wings, a beak, a heart—that play a role in its life. The process is teleological: its efficient cause—initially in the father and later in the organism—acts for the sake of something.
Department Colloquium: Gina Schouten
Department Colloquium: Pauline Kleingeld
Colloquium: Agnes Callard
Colloquium: Laura Valentini
Abstract: The notion of a claim right—with its counterparts “directed duty” or “duty owed to another”—is frequently used in moral discourse, for the purpose of designating a specific and important deontic attribute. I argue that this notion is not fit for this purpose. I show that the concept of a claim right is associated with a family of such attributes (e.g., the powers to demand, waive, and enforce the performance of duties) as well as with the justifications for conferring them on individuals.
Colloquium: Elisabeth Camp
Perspectives are intuitive modes of interpretation, which can be encapsulated in slogans, memes, even caricatures and novels.
Colloquium: Tamar Schapiro
Most philosophers agree that when we act in a weak-willed way, e.g., indulging an appetite against our better judgment, we are not simply being overpowered by an external force. Weak-willed action, though weak, is still in some sense willed. And yet it is also weak. I argue that philosophers have underestimated the difficulty of explaining the sense in which it is weak, and I offer my own account, which draws on the details of my theory of inclination.
Colloquium: Angela Potochnik
Levels of organization and their use in science have received increased philosophical attention of late, including challenges to the well-foundedness or widespread usefulness of levels concepts. One kind of response to these challenges has been to advocate a more precise and specific levels concept that is coherent and useful. Another kind of response has been to argue that the levels concept should be taken as a heuristic, to embrace its ambiguity and the possibility of exceptions as acceptable consequences of its usefulness.