Abstract

Transhumanism is a philosophical, cultural, and political movement
that holds that the human species is only now in a comparatively early
phase and that its very evolution will be altered by developing
technologies. Transhumanists share the belief that an outcome in which
humans have radically advanced intelligence, near immortality, deep
friendships with AI (artificial intelligence) creatures, and elective
body characteristics is a very desirable end for both one's own
personal development and for the development of our species as a
whole. Despite its science fiction-like flavor, the issues that
transhumanism presents deserve to be taken seriously -- the beginning
stages of this radical alteration are supposed to be the outcome of
technological developments that are either here, if not generally
available, or more commonly, technologies that are accepted by many in
the relevant scientific fields as being on their way.  In this talk, I
consider the tranhumanist position on the enhancement debate,
introducing considerations from philosophy of mind and metaphysics. I
observe that when one considers whether to enhance in the radical ways
the transhumanists advocate, one must ask, "Will this radically
enhanced creature still be me?" If not, then, on the reasonable
assumption that one key factor in a decision to enhance oneself is
one's own personal development, even the most progressive technophile
will likely regard the enhancement in question as undesirable. For
when you choose to enhance in these radical ways, the enhancement does
not really enhance you. Examining the enhancement issue through the
lens of the metaphysical problem of personal identity shall thereby
present a serious challenge to transhumanism. Indeed, this is a
pressing issue for any argument made for enhancement.