In the Euthyphro, we find Socrates and his interlocutor inquiring together into the nature of piety.  This dialogue is perhaps most important, not for what it says specifically about the nature of piety, but rather in its examination of the nature of definition more generally.  In Socrates’ arguments against Euthyphro’s proposed definitions of piety, we find criteria for an adequate definition—conditions that must be met for something to count as a good definition, at least to Socrates.

    This talk focuses on Euthyphro’s second attempted definition, that piety is what the gods love (and impiety what the gods hate).  How exactly does this definition fail?  What new condition, if any, is being introduced that a good definition must satisfy?  As we shall see, the standard interpretation of this passage seems to miss the mark.  I will argue that Plato uses this passage to emphasize how his reflection on the nature of the sensible world has informed his understanding of the nature of definition.