Mental Causation?

I’m interested in mental causation, with a focus on phenomenally conscious poperties, as it figures in the interplay between different kinds of non-eliminativists (including brands of physicalists and property dualists). I break down the gravest (or at least what seems to me the most popular) objection to mental causation into two overlapping arguments, which we may call causal exclusion and redundancy. From those arguments I distill three major points: (1) a threat of massive causal overdetermination, (2) the absurdity of downward causation, (3) causation always wells up from the more fundamental to the less fundamental. The only sober outcome, according to those I call faute de mieux anti-mentalists, is that mental properties are (type or token) identical to physical ones. Although it is common to display downward causation as the likeliest culprit, the real problems seem located in (1) and (3). Nevertheless, I examine all three points, but concentrate on (1) and (3). In addition, I argue that the identity outcome is not an option if we seriously contemplate the grounds for individuating properties.