ABSTRACT: Establishing how persons can be answerable for their actions is a sensible constraint to place on an account of practical reason and rational agency. Adhering to this constraint is part of what motivates some philosophers to seek a distinctive element of active self-determination we manifest whenever we act for reasons. Christine M. Korsgaard, for example, argues that a person acts for a reason only if she recognizes some consideration to be a reason, where this recognition motivates her to act. But this requirement, which I call the guidance condition on acting for a reason, appears to generate a vicious regress, a worry to which Korsgaard herself is sensitive. Indeed, her appeal in recent work to the constitutive principles of action can be seen, in part, as a response to this regress worry. I will argue, however, that if Korsgaard is to appeal to the constitutive principles of action to resolve the regress, then we must determine whether acting on such principles is also subject to the guidance condition. This raises a dilemma. If following these constitutive principles is subject to the guidance condition, then the regress remains unresolved. But if not, then the rationale for applying it to acting for a reason vanishes as well. I conclude that, to avoid skepticism about practical reason and rational agency, we must embrace an account of acting for a reason that rejects the guidance condition. But doing so does not show that we cannot be answerable for our actions.