I specialize in philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, and philosophy of race. In philosophy of science, I primarily focus on metaphysical problems in science, such as what is an appropriate way to define "natural kinds." In philosophy of biology, I primarily focus on metaphysical problems in biology, such as whether biological populations can have fuzzy temporal parts and whether there is any way to group organisms into biologically real subspecies. In philosophy of race, you guessed it, I primarily focus on metaphysical problems in race theory, such as whether any folk racial classification divides people into biological groups that are biologically real.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Ph.D., Stanford (philosophy)
M.S., Stanford (biology)
B.A., Cornell (chemistry & philosophy)
Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Race
- Spencer, Q. (conditionally accepted). When is a Genetic Cluster a Population? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
- Spencer, Q. (2016). Do Humans Have Continental Populations? Philosophy of Science 83(5): 791-802.
- Spencer, Q. (2015). Philosophy of Race Meets Population Genetics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 52: 46-55.
- Spencer, Q. (2014). A Radical Solution to the Race Problem. Philosophy of Science 81(5): 1025-1038.
- Spencer, Q. (2014). The Unnatural Racial Naturalism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 46: 38-43.
- Spencer, Q. (2013). Biological Theory and the Metaphysics of Race: A Reply to Kaplan and Winther. Biological Theory 8(1): 114-120.
- Spencer, Q. (2012). What 'Biological Racial Realism' Should Mean. Philosophical Studies 159(2): 181-204.