My research focuses on Plato’s metaphysics and the self-predication of forms. Plato is often criticized for holding the view that all forms genuinely self-predicate; that is, that any form of F is itself an F thing. For instance, the form of tallness is itself a tall thing, etc. My view is that, in fact, Plato never endorses such a view, and that we have good reason to doubt all of the most influential interpretations of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language. I argue for a new interpretation called the Explanatory Predication view, according to which Plato uses his apparent statements of self-predication to emphasize the explanatory role of forms. My interpretation differs crucially from others because I claim that he emphasizes this explanatory role without being committed to any version of a genuine self-predication assumption. Plato does not hold that for all forms, the form of F is an F thing.

• Ancient Philosophy
• History of Political Theory

• Greek and Roman Philosophy
• History of Moral Philosophy

I work on Greek and Roman philosophy, with focus on the natural philosophy of the period (especially Aristotle's and the Stoics'), as well as on the ancient ethical tradition. My recent Ancient Ethics (Routledge 2008) is a systematic treatment of Plato’s, Aristotle’s, Epicurean, and Stoic ethics designed to serve the interests both of students of ancient philosophy and of specialists in contemporary ethics who seek to understand the differences between Ancient and modern ethical philosophy. My current research centers on ancient theories of the emotions and on a translation and commentary on Plato's Laws.